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This paper aims to question the idea of reasonableness in rawls’ account of political 
liberalism. my point is that reasonableness as the moral basis of the liberal society 
provides restrictions for differences – be they philosophical, moral, religious, cultural – to 
be included in the liberal society. notwithstanding rawls’ attempt to expand political 
boundaries and to include those people who do not share moral liberal justification to 
justice as fairness, reasonableness selects “values holders” and assigns to the so-called 
“reasonable” a place in the political debate. The others, the “unreasonable”, are expected 
to become reasonable; alternatively, they would be paid control or even coercion in all the 
circumstances in which they should represent a risk for political stability. i believe that 
rawls gives an incomplete account of unreasonableness: there may well be persons who 
are not “reasonable” in rawlsian terms but who do not necessarily represent a danger 
for the just society. By the fact that they do not endorse values as freedom and equality 
in which fair cooperation is grounded, we cannot infer that they will necessarily try to 
violate the terms around which cooperation is structured by imposing their values on 
others. i proceed as follows: a) i detail the rawlsian political turn in defending justice as 
fairness; b) i focus on the idea of reasonableness as the core of political liberalism; c) i 
defend the thesis that political liberalism needs to revise the idea of unreasonableness if it 
aims to deal with pluralism as a social and political fact.
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this paper aims to question the idea of reasonableness in rawls’ account 
of political liberalism. my point is that reasonableness as the moral 
basis of the liberal society provides restrictions for differences – be they 
philosophical, moral, religious, cultural – to be included in the liberal 
society. notwithstanding rawls’ attempt to expand political boundaries 
and to include those people who do not share moral liberal justification 
to justice as fairness, reasonableness selects “values holders” and assigns to 
the so-called “reasonable” a place in the political debate. the others, the so 
called “unreasonable”, are expected to become reasonable; alternatively, 
they would be paid control or even coercion in all the circumstances in 
which they should represent a risk for political stability. i believe that rawls 
gives an incomplete account of unreasonableness: there may well be persons 
who are not “reasonable” in rawlsian terms but who do not necessarily 
represent a danger for the just society. By the fact that they do not endorse 
values as freedom and equality in which fair cooperation is grounded, we 
cannot infer that they will necessarily try to violate the terms around which 
cooperation is structured by imposing their values on others. i proceed as 
follows: a) i detail the rawlsian political turn in defending justice as fairness; 
b) i focus on the idea of reasonableness as the core civic value of political 
liberalism; c) i defend the thesis that political liberalism needs to revise the 
idea of unreasonableness if it aims to deal with pluralism as a social and 
political fact. 
i start by recapitulating the “political turn” from a Theory of Justice (rawls 
2003) to Political liberalism (rawls 2005). Political liberalism may be seen as a 
remedy to the problem of motivating people to endorse the principles of 
justice and to behave accordingly. rawls says:
To understand the nature and extent of the differences [between Political 
liberalism and a Theory of Justice] one must see them as arising from trying 
to resolve a serious problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the 
fact that the account of stability in Part iii of Theory is not consistent with the 
view as a whole. i believe all differences are consequences of removing that 
inconsistency (rawls 2005, xv-xvi).
in the iii Part of Theory the problem of motivation is faced and apparently 
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resolved by adopting the argument of congruence. rawls believes 
that people may sustain justice insofar as justice is part of their good. 
Specifically, Rawls assumes that people in a fair society have an independent 
sense of justice and aspire to do what is right for its own sake. this does 
not mean that justice is always the best thing for them to do; indeed it may 
require of them to give up any of their specific purposes1. thus, the question 
is what kind of assurance one does have that it is realistically possible for 
people to affirm justice as fairness as part of their good. The congruence 
argument purports to show that under ideal conditions the judgements 
that would be made from the private perspective (judgements regarding a 
person’s good) and the public ones (judgements of justice) will cohere. in 
sustaining this position rawls refers to a complicated argument grounding 
in the aristotelian principle: the main idea here is that the sense of justice is 
among human higher capacities and involves an ability to understand, apply 
and act on and from requirements of justice (rawls 2003, 372-379). 
i am insisting on motivation as motivation for justice is an indispensable 
condition of stability: a social order is hardly stable if people incline to pursue 
their particular good in place of the right for all. to be motivated for justice 
is the first assurance of stability. Stability is the central issue of the Rawlsian 
theory: it is here meant as an indicator of the feasibility of any political 
theory. “We checked to see [...] if justice as fairness is a feasible conception […]; 
this forced us to raise the question of stability” (rawls 2003, p. 508). a theory 
of justice should be feasible to be desirable: a theory that cannot be applicable 
is undesirable2. a conception of justice is stable when its realization by the 
social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense of justice that 
induces citizens “to develop a desire to act in accordance with these principles 
and to do their part in institutions that exemplify them” (rawls 2003, 119). 
in Political liberalism the issue of feasibility becomes more relevant. rawls 
gradually became dissatisfied with the account of the just society as depicted 
in Theory. he finds the just society as designed in Theory to be unrealistic: it is 
quite unrealistic to maintain that people have the same reasons to support 
it and that they similarly view their good as congruent with the right. 
When the veil of ignorance is raised, citizens may realize that justice does 
not correspond to their ideas of good. that means to recognize the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism”: under “the political and social conditions secured by 
1  see Weithman (2010, ch. 7).
2  i may just mention the huge problem concerning ideal theory and its role to guide actions. 
on this point see Pasquali (2009) and Zuolo (2012).  
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basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and 
irreconcilable – and what’s more reasonable – comprehensive doctrines will 
come about and persist” (rawls 2005, 36). he adds that pluralism “is not a mere 
historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the 
public culture of democracy” (ibid.). This clarification may be put in other 
words: pluralism is not an external constraint but it is a fact about liberalism 
and part of any ideal society. liberal democracies promote pluralism as a 
consequence of reasoning under their institutions3. 
on the premise of the fact of pluralism, the stability of the theory is now 
evaluated with regard to its appropriateness in constituting the focus of 
an overlapping consensus among different and conflicting comprehensive 
doctrines endorsed by reasonable citizens. For this stability to be realistically 
possible all the reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirmed by reasonable 
citizens must accept and endorse its political conception of justice in an 
overlapping consensus. When such an overlapping consensus exists, then all 
free and equal citizens endorsing reasonable comprehensive doctrines agree 
on the political conception of justice on the basis of their own particular 
comprehensive reasons. the matter of motivation is here resolved by assuming 
a freestanding political conception of justice that citizens may share. they come 
to defend this political conception as a common moral ground they can agree 
upon in spite of the diversity of their moral justifications4. it means that 
citizens may adhere to the principles of justice backed by their specific 
reasons: these principles may be adopted as a module that fits into and 
can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 
endure in the society regulated by it (rawls 2005, 12-13). the principles 
of justice are worked up from certain “fundamental intuitive ideas” that 
are implicit in the public culture of a democratic society (rawls 2005, 192). 
that explains why people may abide by them on the basis of different 
and even divergent views. they may be said however to converge on 
justice for “right reasons” (i.e. moral reasons), not for prudential reasons 
like opportunity or fear. rawls stresses this point by declaring that the 
overlapping consensus on justice must not be confused with a modus 
vivendi. the modus vivendi is exactly a precarious equilibrium of forces that 
depends on “circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate 
convergence of interests” (rawls 2005, 147). thus, the question of stability 
cannot be addressed by a modus vivendi; it can only be addressed by 
3  on this point see Quong (2011).
4  By common moral ground rawls means a political morality, not a comprehensive one, that 
is, a set of political moral values which may be subscribed by several comprehensive doctrines. 
see rawls (1995).
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striving to realize an overlapping consensus on moral political values such 
that “stability is secured by sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind 
acquired under just institutions” (rawls 2005, 142-143). 
to sum up: in Political liberalism rawls starts by acknowledging the fact 
of pluralism as the result of living under liberal institutions. Pluralism is 
indeed the consequence of the exercise of the practical reason under free 
conditions. Given the fact of pluralism, the moral justification for justice as 
held in Theory turns out to be unrealistic: it is unrealistic that people agree on 
the same justification of justice. Instead, justice as fairness defended in Theory 
may be sustained by each person as a political conception, independently 
from their specific reason for endorsing it. The following point is how people 
may converge on this political conception: convergence may be assured 
once they adopt a method of avoidance according to which divisive issues 
are systematically excluded from the political agenda (rawls 1985). if the 
project of justification in Political liberalism is similar to Theory, now rawls 
avoids relying on controversial moral positions and counts instead on ideas 
and reasons that are widely shared in democratic culture: the method of 
avoidance means to avoid claiming to truth to defend one’s own political 
position. truth is irreconcilably divisive for rawls: truth and politics must 
part company if justice (the theory and the practice of justice) wants to gain 
stability. indeed, the so-called “political turn”  consists in justifying justice 
by renouncing to defend one’s own moral justification as both exclusive and 
exclusively true5. truth is to be replaced by reasonableness when political 
constitutionals are at stake. reasonableness and not truth is the political 
standard of correctness: the objectivity of judgements about justice is 
characterized without reference to the notion of truth (rawls 2005, 127). 
Lastly, avoidance of truth is not to be conflated with scepticism: to avoid 
claiming to one’s truth does not mean to deny it. it means only that we are 
allowed to use our deepest convictions in the construction of the political 
conception within certain limits, being those limits based on what people 
could reasonably accept (see maffettone 2010, 269). 
let me now articulate the meanings of reasonableness6. so far i mentioned 
the notion of reasonableness as if it were a sort of “device” to connect 
comprehensive doctrines and the question of stability through the idea of an 
overlapping consensus. such an overlapping consensus among comprehensive 
doctrines may be achieved only among that class of comprehensive doctrines 
5  on the “political turn” in the rawlsian thought about justice see Weithman (2010).
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that are reasonable, meaning that reasonableness qualifies the group of 
comprehensive doctrines that can find common ground within a liberal-
democratic regime. in so doing, these doctrines may coexist albeit they 
diverge on truth. then, reasonableness instead of truth may respond to 
the central question of Political liberalism: “how is it possible for there to 
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who still 
remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines?” (rawls 2005, 47). reasonableness responds to this initial problem 
of reconciling stability with pluralism: the stability of a fair society is secured 
by citizens’ ability to mediate between their competing comprehensive claims. 
this citizens’ ability is rooted in their reasonableness.
I now add further remarks on reasonableness. I firstly remind that according 
to rawls a person is reasonable when she is willing to propose and honour fair 
terms of cooperation (rawls 2005, xlii). reasonableness indicates reasonable 
persons’ ethical-political ability to share public reasons in a regime of 
reciprocity. Reasonableness may be here defined as the political virtue of 
citizens who show to be reasonable as they take others to be politically 
free and equal, and equally deserving of fair terms of social cooperation. 
secondly, to be reasonable implies also to acknowledge the fact that, when 
freedom of thought and conscience is granted, people adopt reasonable yet 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines. in other words: to be reasonable 
involves to recognize the fact of reasonable pluralism. People are reasonable 
insofar as they support freedom of thought and conscience and recognize the 
consequence of this freedom in terms of reasonable pluralism7. 
in summary: reasonableness implies two aspects – the willingness to 
propose and honour fair terms of cooperation and the willingness to 
recognize the fact of pluralism as the result of the free exercise of practical 
reasons – that substantiate what being reasonable means. 
having said that, reasonableness explains also how and why citizens come 
to distance themselves from their comprehensive doctrines: as they are 
reasonable, they may avoid to assert the truth of their beliefs and try to reach 
an overlapping consensus on liberal values. this capacity of avoidance plays as 
the evidence of their being reasonable. i said that reasonableness is a political 
virtue: it is in the political domain that reasonableness takes the place of 
truth. indeed, the notion of reasonableness is strictly political: that is, it does 
7  on reasonableness in rawls: Boettcher (2004); mandle (1999); archard (2001); rasmussen 
(2004).
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not have to do with the contents of beliefs and with philosophical, moral or 
religious positions. on the contrary, it does have to do only with the attitude 
to tolerate others’ positions as they are acknowledged as legitimate albeit 
different from ones’ own positions. i conclude by saying that reasonableness is 
somehow the winner of a virtual game among values: it is the common value, 
it may be called the common currency of a society that vindicates its fairness. 
having recapitulated the meanings of reasonableness, what about those 
who do not “subscribe” to it? it seems a platitude to state that people who 
do not share the virtue of reasonableness are “unreasonable”. rather, what 
rawls means by “unreasonable” can be equated with planning to engage in 
cooperative schemes for the “wrong reasons” (rawls 2005, 55). unreasonable 
people are unwilling to honour, or even to propose, any general principles 
for specifying fair terms of cooperation. they may adhere to order not being 
properly motivated to support institutions: any adherence to them equates 
to a modus vivendi given that the reasons for adherence are prudential and 
not moral reasons. For rawls, those people are to be kept under control as 
they would impose their beliefs on others: they are considered unreasonable 
not because their belief is thought to be false, but because they are ready to 
impose it on others8. in such cases, says rawls, “the problem is to contain 
them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society” (rawls 
2005, xvi-xvii). reasonable institutions have “the practical task of containing 
them – like war and disease – so that they do not overturn political justice” 
(rawls 2005, 64, n. 19). notwithstanding the fact that unreasonable people 
are a fact of any liberal democracy, rawls trusts liberal institutions in their 
capacity to educate unreasonable people to cultivate in themselves a sense 
of justice. the fair society has a kind of educational or transformative role: 
the “unreasonable” are likely to become reasonable, because of the strong 
positive effects of living under liberal institutions.
rawls hopes that in this way political stability increases and that the 
benefits assured by stability will eventually motivate the “unreasonable” to 
become reasonable (rawls 2005, 163-168).
under actual circumstances, rawls’ hope may be misplaced. there may well 
be persons who will not adopt public reasons to defend their positions in the 
political debate. however, this does not imply that they are ready to impose 
their beliefs on others being unreasonable in the rawlsian terms. the fact that 
they do not share values as freedom and equality in which the fair cooperation 
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is grounded is not a sufficient reason to say that they will necessarily try to 
violate the terms of cooperation itself. i think instead that there may be more 
than one way to be unreasonable. Besides those unreasonable persons who 
actually represent a risk to stability, there may be people who are neither 
reasonable nor unreasonable. i call them “non-reasonable”9. although they do 
not endorse the common values that form the overlapping consensus, they are 
ready to support liberal institutions, albeit for reasons that are not the “right 
ones”. non-reasonable persons may support the liberal democratic order for 
their own reasons, which fall outside the domain of public reason and that may 
not be part of the overlapping consensus. 
unlike rawls, i believe that nothing wrong happens if liberal institutions 
are endorsed by people divided at the level of their fundamental values. 
stability is not necessarily threatened by the fact that institutions may be 
supported also by people who are unable to find any “continuity” between 
their values and the common values, between their beliefs and the civic value 
of reasonableness, but who are nonetheless ready to engage in cooperation 
with the others. such a cooperative attitude, however motivated, may 
provide a strong enough motive to include such non-reasonable people in the 
liberal-democratic citizenry and treat them as political equals. For example, 
non-reasonable people of this kind may recognize liberal democratic society 
as the place to accomplish their mission on earth. although their reasons 
for cooperation are unlikely to be translated into public reasons, they may 
equally count in favour of their sincere participation in a fair system of 
social cooperation. this implies also to contradict rawlsian thesis about the 
connection between reasonable doctrines and reasonableness as an attitude: 
people may behave “not unreasonably”, despite the fact that they hold 
unreasonable doctrines (in the rawlsian sense) and are not ready to renounce 
them for any reason10. 
my conclusive point is that actual circumstances of politics should not 
be neglected by appealing to an ideal overlapping consensus, by which 
common moral values should be shared. non-reasonable people may in 
fact participate in the public debate by putting forward reasons that are 
neither public nor shared by other reasonable citizens. Public debate 
9  For a more detailed assessment of non-reasonableness as alternative to both reasonableness 
and unreasonableness in the rawlsian terms, see sala (2013).
10  rawls inclines to see as reasonable those people who hold reasonable doctrines. By contrast, 
not all people who hold unreasonable beliefs should be called unreasonable. see rawls (1997). about 
the relationship between unreasonable doctrines and reasonable behaviour see the exchange 
among Kelly and mcPherson (2001) and Quong (2004). a comment on it in sala (2013).
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may be opened also to those who may offer their reasons that are hardly 
public reasons: their reasons matter from their specific point of view. 
the fact is that in realistically plural societies several groups advocate 
policies for their non-sharable personal reasons. an enlarged public 
debate is not expected to lead necessarily to an overlapping consensus 
on the basic liberal values. instead, it allows all citizens, including the 
“non-reasonable”, to start from their respective points of view and exhibit 
their reasons publicly (archard 2001). these “non-reasonable” people may 
thus be included in an enlarged public debate, instead of being deprived 
of such an opportunity as it happens in the rawlsian society. indeed, not 
all citizens are reasonable in the rawlsian sense and the problem of how 
to deal with the ‘non-reasonable’ is not a mere accidental matter, but is 
a crucial fact of politics with which the liberal theories of justice should 
concern themselves.
What I mean is that public justification may be conceived of as a wider 
practice in which the “non-reasonable” may participate by putting 
forward their special reasons that are unlikely to be acceptable to all. 
my suggestion is that although the reasons of the non-reasonable are 
likely to be unacceptable to reasonable people, they may nonetheless be 
made intelligible to them, that is, they may be exchanged in public debate 
(gaus 2010). thus, the reasons of the non-reasonable people should not be 
dismissed from public debate in advance of an argument simply on the 
grounds that reasonable people disagree with them. if a political theory 
aspires to be realistic it is crucial that it takes into account the actual 
conditions in which persons may have both moral and non-moral reasons to 
accept the liberal-democratic order notwithstanding the fact that they do 
not share its essential values11. 
11  on realism in political theory with regard to rawlsian tradition: galston (2010), mason 
(2010), horton (2010), 
mccabe (2010). 
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